We introduce and study a class of infinite-horizon non-zero-sum non-cooperative stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents using ideas of statistical mechanics. First we show, in the general case of asymmetric interactions, the existence of a strategy that allows any player to eliminate losses after a finite random time. In the special case of symmetric interactions, we also prove that, as time goes to infinity, the game converges to a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, assuming that all agents adopt the same strategy, using arguments related to those leading to perfect simulation algorithms, spatial mixing and ergodicity are proved. In turn, ergodicity allows us to prove "fixation", i.e. that players will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. The resulting dynamics is related to zero-temperature Glauber dynamics on random graphs of possibly infinite volume.
Introduction
Several models of interacting particle systems, apart of their physical motivation, admit a natural interpretation in terms of social interaction. Famous examples are the voter processes (see e.g. T. Liggett [8] ), or the Sherrington-Kirkpatrick model of spin glasses (see e.g. M. Mézard, G. Parisi and M. Virasoro [10] or section 2.1 in M. Talagrand [12] ). Infinite interacting particle systems have found applications in sociology as well: see, for instance, T. Liggett and S. Rolles [9] for a model of formation of social networks. Ideas of statistical mechanics have also been applied to random economies by H. Föllmer [2] , and to microeconomic modeling of stock prices by H. Föllmer and M. Schweizer [4] (see also H. Föllmer [3] and U. Horst [7] ).
In this paper we introduce and study a class of stochastic games with infinitely many interacting agents. In particular, each individual is randomly linked with others, and has positive or negative feelings regarding them. Moreover, each individual is faced with the need of taking decisions that affect himself and all others to whom he is linked. The objective of each individual is to take (non-cooperative) decisions that ultimately do not affect him negatively. In a stylized setting, which is made precise below, we shall prove that there exists a decision policy achieving this goal, and even more, that if each player adopts this strategy a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is reached. This equilibrium, however, is not Pareto, as one could prove by adapting ideas of O. Häggström [6] , for instance, who proved that zero-temperature dynamics on a random graph does not reach the minimum energy configuration.
Our motivation to study a stochastic dynamics on a random graph (and in particular, without an upper bound on the maximum distance of interacting agents) was the desire to make our model more realistic. Moreover, from the mathematical point of view, problems of spatial mixing and ergodicity of (non-Markovian) stochastic dynamics on random graphs with unboundedly long range interactions seem to be treated here for the first time. It will be evident from our proofs that the corresponding results for boundedly long range interactions are trivial.
The organization of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we describe the model so we show how agents interact and what their aim is; in section 3 a general strategy achieving the goal of each agent is given, and section 4 proves spatial mixing, hence ergodicity, of the dynamics, when all agents adopt the same strategy. Finally, using the results on spatial mixing and ergodicity, we prove that the game "fixates", i.e. that agents will adopt a constant strategy after a finite time. This phenomenon is reminiscent of the fixation of zero-temperature dynamics (see e.g. E. De Santis and C. M. Newman [1] , L. R. Fontes [5] , O. Häggström [6] , S. Nanda, C. M. Newman and D. L. Stein [11] ).
Model and problem formulation
Let us first introduce some notation used throughout the paper. We consider the twodimensional lattice Z 2 with sites x = (x 1 , x 2 ) and distance d defined by
The distance between two sets R, S is d(R, S) = inf{d(x, y) : x ∈ R, y ∈ S}. The cardinality of a subset Γ ⊆ Z 2 is denoted by |Γ|. We denote by Λ M the set of all
The single spin space {−1, +1} is endowed with the discrete topology, and S with the corresponding product topology. Given η ∈ S, or equivalently η : Z 2 → {−1, +1}, and Λ ⊆ Z 2 , we denote by η Λ the restriction of η to Λ. Given a graph G = (V, E), where V and E are the sets of its vertices and edges, respectively, we shall denote by {x, y} an element of E connecting x, y ∈ V . For any x ∈ V , we shall denote by ρ x the distance of the longest edge having x as endpoint, namely we define ρ x = sup
Recall that the distance in variation of two probability measures µ and ν on a discrete set Ω is defined as
We shall now introduce an idealized model of a large community of interacting individuals. The ingredients will be a random graph, a function on its edges (specifying an environment, roughly speaking), and a stochastic process with values in S describing the time evolution of the system. Let G = (V, E) be a random graph, whose set of vertices V is given by all sites of the 2-dimensional lattice Z 2 , and whose set of edges E respect the following rule: edges exist with probability one between each site x and all y such that d(x, y) = 1, and
We suppose that each site is occupied by an individual (we shall often identify individuals with the sites they occupy, when no confusion will arise), and that relations among individuals are modeled by the edges of G and by a function j : V × V → {−1, 0, +1}; j(x, y) = 0 if {x, y} / ∈ E, otherwise j(x, y) ∈ {−1, +1}. In particular, we shall say that individuals x and y are linked if {x, y} ∈ E, and the value j(x, y) shall account for the "feelings" of x towards y: we set j(x, y) = +1 if x is a "friend" of y, and j(x, y) = −1 if x is an "enemy" of y. We do not assume symmetry of j, i.e. friendship of an individual towards another may not be reciprocal. Moreover, we assume that individuals do not know with whom they are connected, nor whether these individuals are friends or enemies. Note also that in this model x can be friend of y, y friend of z, but x and z can be either friends or enemies (a phenomenon also called frustration in physics).
Let us now introduce a stochastic process σ : [0, ∞) → S modelling the evolution of the "action" (or opinion) of the individuals. We shall use a graphical construction of the process, which provides a specific version of basic coupling, i.e. it provides versions of the whole family of stochastic processes on G (or on any finite subset of it), all on the same probability space. We assume that the initial configuration σ 0 is chosen from a symmetric Bernoulli product measure. Moreover, the continuous-time dynamics of σ t is given by independent Poisson processes (with rate 1) at each site x ∈ V corresponding to those times (t x,n ) n∈N when the individual x is asked to update his opinion. Before describing the set of feasible ways of opinion updating, let us introduce a reward for a generic individual x at time t x,n , as a result of his action:
where we set, for simplicity, t ≡ t x,n .
We allow x to base his decision on the history of σ Λs (s), s ≥ 0, and h(x), where Λ s are finite balls centered in x with random radius which is nondecreasing with respect to s, finite almost surely for all s ≥ 0, and not 'exploding'. Formally, the decision of individual x at time t x,n is a {−1, +1}-valued random variable u x,n measurable with respect to the σ-algebra generated by {σ Λs (s), s ≤ t x,n } and {h s (x), s ≤ t x,n }, where Λ s are balls centered in x such that
exists with probability one, and |Λ ∞ | < ∞ with probability one. We shall denote by E x t the filtration just defined. The dynamics of σ is then completely specified by the updating rule
Several remarks are in order: the reward h t (x) obtained by individual x as a result of his decision at time t = t x,n is positive if the difference between pleased and damaged friends is bigger than difference between pleased and damaged enemies, negative if the opposite happens, and zero if the value is the same. Since at a fixed arrival time t = t x,n of the Poisson clock of x no other clock is ringing, i.e. P(t y,m = t) = 0 for all y = x and for all m ∈ N, the dynamics of σ is well-defined (also using the graphical construction). Finally, at any positive time t, σ t (x) represents the last decision taken by individual x up to time t. We formulate the following problem for the generic individual x: find a strategy
for all t ≥ T x , where T x is a finite (random) time.
Admissible strategies that eliminate losses
In this section we construct explicitly a strategy π x for the generic individual x that asymptotically eliminate negative rewards, i.e. such that h t (x) ≥ 0, almost surely, for all t greater than a random time, which is finite with probability one. It will also be clear that this strategy is non-cooperative, that is π x eventually eliminate negative rewards irrespectively of the strategies adopted by all other individuals. For simplicity of notation let us describe the strategy π ≡ π 0 for the individual x = O. The arrival times of his Poisson process and the corresponding decisions and rewards will be denoted by t n , u n , and h n , n ∈ N, respectively.
The strategy π = (u 1 , u 2 , . . .) is best defined algorithmically through a decision tree. We also need an additional "data structure", i.e. a collection R of ordered triples of the type (η, u, h), where η ∈ S is supported on finite balls, u ∈ {−1, +1}, and h ∈ {−1, 0, +1}.
At the first arrival time t 1 , u 1 is chosen accordingly to a Bernoulli law with parameter 1/2 (a "fair coin toss"), and (σ Λ 1 , u 1 , h 1 ) is added to R. The description of the algorithm then follows inductively: at time t n+1 , let Λ Mn be the support of the last configuration added to R. Let σ ′ := σ Λ Mn (t n+1 −) and check whether there exists (σ ′ , u ′ , h ′ ) ∈ R.
• If yes, set
with the convention 0/|0| := 1. The reward h n+1 corresponding to u n+1 is now obtained.
-If h n+1 ≥ 0, no further action is needed.
-If h n+1 < 0, then add to R the triplet (σ Λ Mn+1 , u n+1 , h n+1 ).
• Otherwise, set u n+1 := sgn(σ ′ ), and add to R the triplet (σ ′ , u n+1 , h n+1 ).
Remark 1 One of the key steps of the algorithm requires one to look for a triplet
This operation is uniquely determined, i.e. there can exist only one triplet (σ ′ , u ′ , h ′ ) ∈ R with a given σ ′ . This can be seen as a consequence of the structure of the algorithm itself. Namely, as soon as the player "observes" the same configuration σ ′ = σ Λ with a different associated outcome h, he will immediately enlarge the support of observed configurations Λ.
We shall now prove that the strategy just defined eliminates losses for large times.
Theorem 2 For any individual x there exists a random time T x , finite with probability one, such that
Proof. Let us define a sequence of random times (τ n ) n∈N as follows:
with the convention that inf ∅ = +∞. In other words, τ n is the first time that individual x includes into his information set R the box Λ n+1 (and if this never happens, then τ n = +∞). Let now τ k be the last finite element of the sequence (τ n ) n∈N . By assumption (2) we know that |{y : {x, y} ∈ E}| is finite, hence k ≤ ρ x because h t (x) depends only on those y linked to x, for all times t. Therefore the biggest Λ n observed by the agent in the origin is finite. Define the family of sets
It clearly holds A k (t 1 ) ⊆ A k (t 2 ) for t 1 < t 2 , hence we can define
Since A k (t) ⊂ {−1, +1} Λ k , and Λ k is finite, then there exists
We claim that h x,n ≥ 0 for all t x,n > T x . In fact, for every t x,n > T x there exists (σ, u, h) ∈ R with σ(y) = σ tx,n (y) for all y ∈ Λ k . But since τ k+1 = ∞, the algorithm will give as output a u n such that h n ≥ 0 (to convince oneself it is enough to "run" the algorithm). In a more suggestive way, one could say that after T x individual x has already been faced at least once with all possible configurations that are relevant for him, and therefore knows how to take the right decision.
Remark 3 Note that the strategies of other individuals never enter into the arguments used in the proof. Therefore individual x is sure to reach the goal of eliminating losses in finite time irrespectively of the strategies played by all other individuals. However, we would like to stress that the random time T x is not a stopping time (i.e. it is not adapted to the filtration E x t ). In fact, T x depends in general on the decisions of other individuals, whose policies are not necessarily adapted to E x t . In general, even if all policies were adapted, the random times {T x } x∈Z 2 would not be stopping times. Let us also observe that although we formally allowed the strategy π x to be adapted to E x t , the information used by the strategy constructed in the proof of Theorem 2 is much smaller.
Spatial mixing and ergodicity
The main result of this section is to prove that a spatial mixing property holds. We shall work under the following hypothesis.
Standing assumption. It holds
for all y such that d(x, y) > 1, where C is a positive constant.
Note that assumption (3) implies (2). Before stating the main theorem of this section, we need the following definition. (ii) Given any couple (x, y) ∈ Z d × Z d , the probability P({x, y} ∈ E) is defined and it can depend on d(x, y). Moreover, for any choice of (x, y), (v, w) ∈ Z d × Z d with {x, y} = {v, w}, the events {x, y} ∈ E and {v, w} ∈ E are mutually independent.
(iii) The evolution of the process is local, i.e. σ tx,n (x) is measurable with respect to F x tx,n , where F x t denotes the σ-algebra generated by {σ s (y) :
(iv) Both the probability of two agents being linked and the evolution of σ are translation invariant, i.e. P({x, y} ∈ E) = P({x + v, y + v} ∈ E) and P(σ t ∈ A|σ 0 = η) = P(σ t ∈ A + v|σ 0 (·) = η(· + v)).
We can now state the main theorem of this section. In the following we will write Λ c = Z 2 \ Λ.
Theorem 5 If σ is PPL and satisfies (3), then σ satisfies the spatial mixing property
where Λ 0 is any finite region in Z 2 .
Note that the process σ is translation invariant if each agent adopts the same strategy at each decision time (the strategy does not need to be the one defined in section 3). Before giving the proof of the theorem, we establish some auxiliary results. We shall use the following terminology: by "box of side length L" we mean the set [−L/2, L/2] 2 ⊂ Z 2 . For ρ < 1, we call "subbox of side length L ρ " any one of the L 1−ρ square sets into which a box of side length L can be subdivided. We always assume L ρ , L 1−ρ ∈ N (without loss of generality, as it will be clear). Furthermore, we shall say that two subboxes R and S are "neighbors" if d(R, S) = 1, so every subbox has 8 neighbor subboxes. We shall call "path of subboxes" a sequence of subboxes (R k ) k=1,...,K such that R k and R k+1 are neighbors for each k = 1, . . . , K − 1. Two subboxes R, S are "linked" if there exist x ∈ R, y ∈ S such that {x, y} ∈ E.
In the following lemma we introduce a sequence of boxes increasing to Z 2 , each of one further subdivided into a variable number of boxes also increasing to Z 2 , but at a lower rate. Proof. We use a Borel-Cantelli argument on a suitable sequence of box side lengths L n . In particular, let L be a positive integer, Λ L a square of side L, subdivided into subboxes of side L ρ . The probability of an agent x to be linked with some other agent of a non-neighbor subbox is bounded by
Lemma 6 There exist a sequence of integer numbers
where C, C 1 , C 2 are positive constants. Therefore two agents in non-neighbor subboxes exist with probability not larger than
Taking now a subsequence L n growing to infinity rapidly enough,
where A Ln denotes the event that Λ Ln contains linked non-neighbor subboxes. By BorelCantelli lemma, only a finite number of occurrences of A Ln can happen, which finishes the proof.
Recall that for a sequence of i.i.d. standard exponential random variables {X i } one has
where the so-called rate function Φ is given by
Proof of Theorem 5. We use a coupling argument to show that
and hence, by the inequality
that (4) holds. We construct two coupled systems σ ′ , σ ′′ on the same probability space supporting σ in the following way: σ ′ x (0) = σ ′′ x (0) = σ x (0) for all x ∈ Λ; σ ′ and σ ′′ update their state according to the same translation-invariant rule of σ; all other randomness in the system (the random graph, the Poisson processes, the "coin tosses" needed for the decision rules) coincide. Define, for any x ∈ V , the random time
and introduce a process
Using a pictorial language, we shall say that we color x with black as soon as the two processes σ ′ and σ ′′ differ at x. Let us also introduce another processν : [0, ∞) × V → {0, 1} with the propertyν x (t) ≥ ν x (t) a.s. for all x and all t. The dynamics ofν is specified as follows:ν x (0) = 0 for all x ∈ V , andν x can turn to one as a consequence of two classes of events. In particular, (i)ν x (t) = 1 if there exists x ′ belonging to the same subbox of x such that ν x ′ (t) = 1, and (ii)ν x (τ ) = 1 if there exists y belonging to a neighbor subbox such thatν y (τ ) = 1, where τ is any arrival time of the Poisson process relative to x. Moreover, we assume that 1 is an absorbing state forν x , for all x. Using again a pictorial analogy, we could say that the black area generated byν is bigger than the black area generated by ν. In particular, as soon as a site x turns black, (i) implies that the whole subbox to which it belongs becomes black as well. By Lemma 6, there exists a positive integer N and a sequence L n such that for all n > N the boxes Λ Ln contain no linked non-neighbor subboxes. The shortest path of subboxes from the boundary of the box Λ Ln to its center has length L 1−ρ n /2 (therefore, for n large enough, the shortest path of subboxes from the boundary of the box Λ Ln to Λ 0 has length greater or equal than
is the first arrival time of the Poisson processes relative to x), one has that the distribution of T Λ L ρ is Exp(L 2ρ ), where Exp(λ) stands for the law of an exponential random variable with parameter λ. The minimum time for the formation of a path of k "black" subboxes along a fixed path from the boundary of Λ Ln to the origin is given by
for all n > N (from now we shall tacitly assume n > N ), where T 1 , . . . , T k are i.i.d. exponential random variables with parameter L 2ρ n (independence and the value L 2ρ n follow by the memoryless property of the exponential distribution).
Note that the sequence of subboxes in a path turning black does not influence the minimum time needed for the formation of such path, which is a sum of independent exponential random variables of parameter L 2ρ n , using again the memoryless property of exponential distributions. It follows by (5) that, for 0 < α < 1, one has
Denoting by T ∂Λ Ln →O the (random) time needed to form a path of black subboxes from the boundary of Λ Ln to the origin O, we obtain the estimate
Here the term 4L
1−ρ n accounts for the possible initial subbox on the boundary of Λ L , and 8 · 7 k−1 is an upper bound for the number of paths (of subboxes) of length k starting in a given subbox. We obtain that, as n → ∞, the term on the right hand side goes to zero like e −βL 1−ρ n (modulo polinomial terms), with β a positive constant. Again by a Borel-Cantelli argument we obtain, at least for a subsequences L n k of L n , that
Moreover, the evolution of central subbox is completely independent on the consifiguration outside Λ until it turns black, and so the theorem is proved for this subsequence. Although (6) has been proved only for a particular choice of a sequence of increasing boxes Λ n , one can easily show that any increasing sequence of boxes will do. In fact, the supremum appearing in (6) is decreasing with respect to Λ, hence it is enough to prove the theorem for any fixed subsequence.
Fixation
In this section we shall work under the general assumptions introduced in section 2 and 4, and furthermore we assume that the each player adopts the same strategy (hence the dynamics is translation invariant), and that interactions are symmetric, i.e. that j(x, y) = j(y, x) for any x, y ∈ V . The last hypothesis is essential, as it would be possible to find counterexamples to our results in the case of asymmetric interactions.
We also assume that all the agents use the same strategy presented in section 3, thus our process is PPL and for this process we obtain spatial mixing using Theorem 5. As before, we shall denote by x an arbitrary agent, fixed throughout this section. Let us define the random time T x as T x = sup{t : at time t agent x sees a new configuration or loses}.
As it follows from Theorem 2, T x is finite with probability one. Moreover, by definition, agent x will not loose at any time after T x . Let us also define the random variable M x as the number of times agent x changes his state (i.e. updates his opinion) during the time interval (0, +∞). The main result of this section is the following:
Each agent x ∈ V updates his opinion only a finite number of time, i.e.
Before proving theorem 7, we shall need some more definitions and preparatory results. Let us recall the definition of ρ x :
the distance from x of his farthest connected agent. Note that one has, as follows by the standing assumption (3),
where C and K are constants depending on x. Therefore Eρ k x , 1 ≤ k ≤ 5 are finite:
Let us also define the energy (or Lyapunov) function on a finite set Λ ⊂ Z 2 as
In the following we write by Λ n = [−n, n] 2 .
Lemma 8 There exists a continuous function
Proof. By the definitions ofh x (σ(t)), ρ x , it follows that for each time t
hence, taking expectations, recalling (10), and using translation invariance
At any time t, using the space ergodicity of the system (implied by the spatial mixing property proved in Theorem 5), we obtain
Setting e(t) = Eh O (σ(t)), we just have to prove that e is continuous. Using again the spatial ergodicity of σ, the proportion of agents in Λ n taking at least a decision in the time interval ]t 1 , t 2 [ tends to 1 − e −(t 2 −t 1 ) ≤ t 2 − t 1 as n → ∞. Since each agent is endowed with a Poisson process that is independent from all other processes and random variables describing the dynamics of the system, the mean energy variation of each agent is bounded by Eρ 2 . Therefore we also have
i.e. the function e is Lipschitz continuous.
Let us now define the following discrete random sets for agent x, which are subsets of the set of arrival times of his Poisson process: N 1 (x) = {t : t ≤ T x , the agent in x sees a known configuration at time t and loses} N 2 (x) = {t : t ≤ T x , there is an arrival of the Poisson process in x} \ N 1 (x)
Note that by definition of T x , at any time t > T x agent x can only see known configurations, and can only win. We also define, for every t > 0 and x ∈ Z 2 , the random sets
Moreover, for Λ ⊂ Z 2 , we set
The dynamics of the system and the definition of e(t) imply that e(t) is determined only by the changes of σ τ (·), τ ∈ {N i (t, x)} x∈Z 2 , i = 1, 2, 3. We can therefore write e(t) = e 1 (t) + e 2 (t) + e 3 (t), where e i (t) denotes the component of e(t) determined by changes of σ τ (·) for τ ∈ {N i (t, x)} x∈Z 2 . Moreover one has e 2 (t) ≤ 0 because we are eliminating the arrivals where the agent lost, and in this case the energy can only decrease.
We are now in the position to prove the theorem on the fixation of the stochastic dynamics. Proof of Theorem 7. In virtue of the translation invariance of the system, it is enough to prove the result for the agent in the origin. Thus we only need to show that |N 3 (O)| is almost surely finite. First we observe that one has e 1 (t) = lim
because the number of changes in the origin N 1 (t, O) are at most ρ O (the maximum number of enlargements of the box observed by the agent x), and in any change the energy can increase at most of ρ 2 O (see (11) , (12)). Finally, the spatial ergodicity yields the almost sure upper bound in (16). At any time τ ∈ N 3 the energy H Λ (σ(t)) decreases at least of one unit, i.e. H Λ (σ(t)) ≤ H Λ (σ(t − )) − 1, otherwise the agent does not change opinion. Thus e 3 (t) = lim
where we have used once more the spatial ergodicity. By Lemma 8 and noting that the energy is initially zero (because agents choose +1 or −1 with probability 1/2), one has the following inequality
−Eρ
2 ≤ e(t) = e 1 (t) + e 2 (t) + e 3 (t) ≤ e 1 (t) + e 3 (t), which holds uniformly in time t. Using inequalities (16) and (17) we obtain E|N 3 (t, O)| ≤ Eρ 3 O + Eρ 2 O < ∞ uniformly in t, hence also in the limit as t → ∞. But E|N 3 (O)| < ∞ obviously implies |N 3 (O)| < ∞ a.s., so we have shown that M O ≤ |N 1 (O)| + |N 2 (O)| + |N 3 (O)| < ∞ and the proof is complete.
Remark 9
We can also deduce, following the proof of Theorem 7, that
as an immediate consequence of Markov inequality.
Remark 10 A possible extension of our stylized model is the introduction of transaction costs. For instance, one could require players to pay a fee in order to change their opinions. Thus, using our strategy in the case of symmetric interactions {j(x, y)} (x,y)∈V ×V , the generic player, after a finite random time, will not lose.
